How do property rights evolve when unoccupied areas attract economic use? Who are the first claimants on the frontier and how do they establish their property rights? When do governments provide de jure property rights? We present a conceptual framework that addresses these questions and apply it to the frontiers of Australia, Brazil and the U.S. Our framework stresses the crucial role of politics as frontiers develop, by identifying situations where the competition for land by those with de facto rights and those with de jure rights leads to violence or potential conflicts.
INTRODUCTION
Frontiers are areas not previously used or occupied by non-indigenous inhabitants that are subsequently put to economic use by new settlers. The use of the frontier is influenced by incremental or large changes in demographics, technology, preferences, and other internal and external factors that change relative prices and bring about new opportunities on land for inmigrants. By their nature, frontiers are places where property rights emerge and evolve, which make them ideal for the study of institutions and institutional change. This has been reflected in the large volume of published work in the past decades on the impact of colonial institutions on current economic performance. These analyses find that the type of property rights that emerged initially on the frontiers crucially determined how property rights evolved overtime.
Another argument in this literature is that the initial institutions had surprisingly long-lasting effects on the performance of the countries. We propose an alternative approach to understanding the process of frontier settlement of emerging and evolving property rights that contrasts with two prominent theories in the literature: the externality analysis of Harold Demsetz and the factor endowment analyses of Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff, and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson.
1 Each of these approaches, ours included, starts with a neoclassical explanation that the costs and benefits presented by opportunities at the frontier shape the property rights that initially emerge. Our explanation differs by emphasizing the subsequent roles played by norms and politics in the process of 1 Demsetz, "Toward"; Engerman and Sokoloff, "Factor Endowments, Institutions", "Factory Endowments, Inequality"; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, "Colonial Origins", "Institutions." changes in property rights over time, and how these changes in property rights influence economic, social and political development.
The classic Demsetz hypothesis expects property rights to emerge not only whenever "it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs", but also maintains that there will be a continual process of adjustments in property rights "to accommodate to the externalities associated with important changes in technology or market values." 2 This view postulates that economic interests will push for property rights to change whenever they are no longer well-suited to the changing economic environment. In this zero transaction costs world property rights will never deviate far from an efficient allocation.
Engerman and Sokoloff, followed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson and many others also view the economic opportunities presented by the frontier in the form of initial factor endowments of land, labor, climate and disease as the fundamental determinants of the initially established property rights. 3 Yet contrary to Demsetz, the later scholars argue that the initial property rights arrangements do not tend to change easily, even when they become the source of blatant losses and inefficiencies from the perspective of society as a whole. In those places where the best economic response to the initial factor endowments involved labor exploitation and high economies of scale, as in most of South and Central America and in the Caribbean, the emerging property rights reflected those characteristics of exploitation and inequality. In places where the initial factor endowments favored small-scale farming, as in the Northern United
States, or Canada, the initial property rights exhibited characteristics of greater equality and participation. Because these early property rights and other institutions are key determinants of who has voice in the policymaking process, they are very strong forces that lead the nature of the wealth and power distribution to persist over time. This persistence works through the choices of immigration, education, and land policies as well as the franchise, and patterns of 2 Demsetz, "Toward" p. 350 and p.354. 3 Banjeree and Iyer, "History, Institutions"; Dell, "Persistent Effects"; Easterly and Levine, "Tropics, Germs"; Feyer and Sacerdote, "Colonialism"; Iyer, "Discrete"; Rodrik, Subrmaniam and Trebbi, "Institutions Rule" among others.
banking and capital formation, inter alia, so that colonies which started with unequal and exclusionary arrangements would continue to have those same characteristics whereas those that started with greater equality and inclusion saw those same characteristics persist and pervade their future societies.
An interesting implication of this pattern of development is that those colonies which presented less attractive economic opportunities in the beginning ended up growing substantially faster over the centuries because the equality and openness of its property rights institutions are seen as being more conducive to entrepreneurship, innovation and wealth accumulation. In this 'reversal of fortune' the initially more productive and economically attractive colonies were impeded from following that same successful developmental path by the exclusionary nature of their institutions and property rights. 4 This phenomenon would not happen in a Demstez world as the ill-performing property rights would be transacted away.
Although the initial conditions view has had a tremendous influence on the literature, it has also come under severe criticism. John Coatsworth states that "the Engerman and Sokoloff thesis, while plausible, is almost certainly wrong. Some have argued that high inequality appeared very early in the post-conquest Americas, and that this fact supported rent-seeking and anti-growth institutions which help explain the disappointing growth performance we observe there even today. This paper argues to the contrary. Compared with the rest of the world, inequality was not high in pre-conquest 1491, nor was it high in the postconquest decades following 1492. Indeed, it was not even high in the mid-19th century just prior Latin America's belle époque. It only became high thereafter. Historical persistence in Latin American inequality is a myth. North, Summerhill, and Weingast, "Order, ' p. 4 The differential processes of economic development over the last century cannot be understood just by an examination of the physical endowments of the countries and the technologies available, since these were all very similar. In our view political economy factors were decisive. At least for the economies we consider, endowments were not fate.
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The common thread in all critiques is that, although initial factor endowments are crucial determinants of the property rights that emerge, and although those initial institutions do tend to be highly inertial, this does not preclude other forces from dramatically altering the path of development along the way. This paper analyzes the settlement process on three frontiers, Australia, Brazil and the U.S., to highlight the forces and the channels through which property rights change from the initial endowments perspective. Both social norms and politics shaped the process of property rights formation in all three countries.
Australia, the U.S., and Brazil are all physically large and each had different patterns of land settlement on their frontiers, which allows us to examine the way in which the extant specified property rights in each case affected settlement and in particular the potential for, and emergence of subsequent land conflict. In accordance with the Demsetz, and Engerman and Sokoloff approaches, it is expected that first possessors on a frontier establish and enforce efficient de facto property rights. 9 However, contrary to Demsetz and Engerman and Sokoloff our first contribution is to show that conflict and rent dissipation arises when the actor (individual, group or government) who specifies the property rights to the land does not coincide with the actor who enforces the property rights.
At early stages land is abundant, property rights are irrelevant, and no conflicts ensue.
At some point, though, as additional but homogeneous claimants arrive at the frontier, social norms tend to arise that mediate and coordinate the allocation and use of the claimants' land.
Typically previous land allocation and uses get raised to social norms in a smooth process as competition is still relatively low at this stage and homogeneous claimants in terms of wealth and culture can circumvent the free rider problem relatively easily. As the returns to the land [ Table 1 here]
In each combination of specification and enforcement depicted in the 4 cells of Table 1 it is possible to identify the likelihood of conflict and violence. In the 1 st and 4 th cells little conflict or violence arises because the parties responsible for specification and enforcement are aligned. Conflict and violence are more likely to occur when the party specifying the rights is not the same as the party undertaking enforcement. Cells 2 and 3 depict these possible combinations. In cell 2a, the state provides de jure rights that merely elevate the de facto situation to the level of the law and conflict is not expected. But in many cases the state specifies property rights yet fails to enforce the claims (cell 2b). The failure to enforce may arise due to political power of the de facto land claimants or the high costs of enforcing the claims when the frontier is more distant from the settled area or there are higher marginal costs of transportation.
By its nature a democratic state caters to a wide variety of interests. Many may prefer different arrangements regarding the expansion of the frontier than that the de facto rights that had already evolved. Distant urban voters, for example, may have an idyllic view of a frontier peopled by small family farms and may pressure the national government to favor the distribution of frontier lands to smallholders as opposed to the larger operations already established. Whenever the political configuration is such that the state chooses to recognize the rights of claimants other than those already on the land, but is unable to provide the corresponding enforcement, the probability of conflict increases significantly (cell 3). Here again each side has a claim to the land -one de jure and the other de facto -and conflict is typically the means to determine whose right trumps the other's right. Such a situation is more likely to arise when the frontier is initially occupied by large land holders and extensions of the franchise or later uses without economies of scale lead to political pressure to break up the large land holdings.
Yet even in the cases of cells 2b and 3b, where new claimants acquire land rights but the government does not specify (3b) or enforce property rights (2b), conflict will not materialize if there is a large imbalance in violence capacity between possessors and new entrants. If, for example, those who are granted de jure rights are few or disorganized, conflict may be preempted. But, when both sides are more evenly matched, the possibility of violence is greater as each side perceives good odds in the case of conflict. Even if the de jure right holders are not wealthy compared to the de facto claimants, they may be so numerous and/or organized that conflict nevertheless ensues.
In all three of our case studies the settlement process and development of property rights reached situations depicted in cell 2 and this led to considerable conflict and rent dissipation.
The implication from our framework and case studies is that the combination of specification and enforcement in cell 2 is not only a conceptual possibility, but is rather quite probable.
Another situation where the state may chose to specify property rights to parties other than those on the land arises when the state decides to sell the land in order to raise revenue as analyzed by Alan Dye and Sumner La Croix. 14 Dye and La Croix also note that the threat of violence from indigenous peoples, who oppose the settlement process, may lead the state not to enforce the de jure rights.
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In the next three sections we analyze the emergence and evolution of property rights on the 19 th century frontiers in Australia, the U.S. and Brazil. Despite the variety of circumstances, a distinct pattern emerges that contributes to our understanding of the forces that shape the progression of property rights on frontiers. Despite the idiosyncrasies of each country's experience, all three cases passed through four basic stages as their frontiers evolved. In the first stage there is little scarcity and large producers with capital claimed the land. This is cell (1) in when government decides to grant de jure rights to parties other than those on the land but fails to provide adequate enforcement (cell 2b). This took place in all of our cases, always associated with electoral concerns of the central government, suggesting an important mechanism through which politics can change a path that is at first overwhelmingly determined by economic factors. At this point the potential for violence was high as there was no institutionalized way to arbitrate the competing claims. Nevertheless, in some cases actual conflicts remained subdued as one side had an overwhelming violence potential. The fourth stage is reached when, possibly after much waste and dissipation, the government effectively specifies and enforces the de jure property rights, reverting to a state of low probability of conflict (cell 4).
SETTLEMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN FRONTIER
Settlement of the Australian frontier began in the late 1820s. As a penal colony, the British Colonial Office (BCO) in London determined economic and political policy, including land policies. 16 The colonial governor oversaw the implementation of BCO directives. In 1827, the BCO attempted to concentrate settlement within an area known as the Nineteen Countiesthe legal limits of settlement. However, several factors caused the spread of population beyond these boundaries to the frontier. Population increases resulted in land scarcity within the settlement limits. 17 Land prices within the Nineteen Counties were high, set at a minimum price of £1/acre. 18 Growing demand and rising prices for Australian wool in Britain increased the 16 In 1788, the British Crown declared the Australian continent 'terra nullius' that is, a land belonging to no one. This implicitly denied the existence of ownership rights by first inhabitants thereby dispossessing
Australian Aboriginals under the British territorial claim. It followed that all land in Australia, unless expressly granted to individuals as free hold, was owned by the Crown. 17 Roberts, Squatting age. 18 Burroughs, Britain and Australia.
value accruing from land settlement outside the boundaries. 19 Moreover, inadequate police numbers made the boundaries unenforceable.
Land occupation outside the Nineteen Counties was illegal and these settlers became known as squatters. Pastoral squatters arrived at the frontier first because they received a net benefit earlier than smaller agriculturalists. Beyond the Nineteen Counties, land was abundant and squatters occupied where they pleased. Australia's arid climate and economies of scale in wool production resulted in large land claims on the frontier, averaging between 24,000 and 34,000 acres. 20 In line with the framework possessor specification and enforcement (Table 1, cell 1) accompanied large land holdings. Possessor specification was vague with property boundaries typically defined by natural features including rivers and marked trees. Possessor enforcement included squatters' using employees stationed on each parcel to defend claims.
Combined, a lack of de jure rights and imprecise boundaries increased the potential for conflict between white settlers as settlement increased but there is little evidence of actual conflict. By 1850 the BCO resolved the extent of de jure rights conferred under the lease system.
On frontier lands leases were valid for 14 years with rentals set at a minimum of £10 for 4,000
sheep with an increment of £2 10 shillings for every 1,000 sheep thereafter. For the duration of the lease, land could only be sold to the occupier. On a lease's expiration squatters could claim preemptive rights to one block of 640 acres for every 16,000 acres of leased land at £1/acre.
Leases alleviated the problem of vague boundaries that had persisted under the license system thereby providing more accurate government specification. Further, leases transformed occupancy rights into ownership rights for sections of squatters land (Table 1 , cell 3).
Paralleling the resolution of the leasehold system for pastoral land, gold was discovered.
Initially, alluvial gold supplies were plentiful and capital investment in mining was low. and mine for a number of years. By the mid-1850s, however, alluvial gold supplies became scarce and the industrial sectors were unable to absorb the surplus labor, resulting in mounting unemployment. Once gold was nearly exhausted, the opportunity costs of former miners of moving to the pastoral frontier fell, and many ex-miners wanted to turn to agriculture for a living. The now expanded population began to pressure the government for land reform.
During the same period political changes meant that NSW was divided into three separate colonies: NSW, Victoria (1850), and Queensland (1859), each with responsible government, which had the right to legislate over its own affairs, including land policy. Each of the three colonies also had parliaments elected by the population. These political changes were critical in determining the supply of de jure rights to land because they diluted the political power of squatters by extending the franchise to ex-gold miners and other potential claimants.
The increasing political power of new claimants led to pressures on the government to establish de jure rights that redistributed land away from incumbents. In Australia, the pressure stemmed from fear of social unrest and the potential for violent uprising that had already occurred on the gold fields as well as high unemployment. 39 These realities led even the squatter-dominated upper houses to pass reform legislation increasing the potential for conflict on pastoral lands.
Victoria and NSW introduced land reform, referred to as 'selection' in 1860 and1861
respectively. Both states' legislation was almost identical and permitted any individual to select a maximum of 320 acres anywhere in a colony except that held under leasehold. The legislation imposed several conditions on selectors: payment of a 25% deposit; one year of residence on selected land; and improvements to the value of £1/acre. Once leases on squatting land expired, the government introduced a selection process that sanctioned competition for the holdings of squatters. Squatters, who typically leased 24,000 to 34,000 acres, could use preemption to 39 Violent clashes between miners and the military referred to as the Eureka Stockade took place on Victoria's largest gold field in 1854. Weston Bate, argues this event was a critical turning point in colonial politics generating a shock-wave that helped carry constitutional reforms that may otherwise have "floundered on the rocks of upper house opposition" (Gold Rushes, p. 46). Social unrest over demands for land reform had led to riots in Victoria during August, 1860 but not so in NSW.
secure 640 acres out of every 16,000 acres held under lease against selection. If preemption was exercised strategically, a practice referred to as 'peacocking,' squatters could monopolize access to water for a large proportion of their land, rendering it impossible for selectors to claim any of the squatter's property. 40 However, selection meant government specification and enforcement now favored the reallocation of land to smallholders. In this case the probability of conflict was high but little actual conflict ensued. However, the shift in de jure property rights led to high levels of rent dissipation as squatters redirected productive resources into evading redistribution.
Little actual violent conflict occurred after the Parliaments introduced selection because budget constraints prevented the governments from effectively enforcing the selectors' newly specified rights ( Australia, the violence advantage favored the squatters. It was easier to defend than usurp. The squatters were willing to defend each other's claims against encroachment. Having worked on the land and accumulated large amounts of capital over nearly 25 years of uncontested occupation, the squatters were wealthy and could hire more guns, and they knew the quality of the land better. Even though there were conflicting claims, the new claimants could not rely on government to enforce them and did not resort to violence because the squatters held an overwhelming advantage (cell 2a).
Nevertheless, selection led to considerable rent dissipation as squatters diverted productive resources to maintaining their claims and evading redistribution. The significant wealth of squatters provided them with the resources to engage in multifaceted evasion by exploiting legislative loopholes to defend claims. 43 In short, land reform under selection led to government specification but an absence of effective government enforcement. This led to substantial rent dissipation but produced little actual conflict between squatters and selectors, a situation that also transpired on the high plains of the U.S. West. Eventually, the introduction of further land reform to induce cooperative settlement underpinned by irrigation and accompanied by government funding to voluntarily acquire squatting runs, led to a migration of the many early frontier settlers to urban areas.
SETTLEMENT OF THE U.S. FRONTIER
There have been numerous studies on the overall pattern of land settlement in the U.S. Here we want to focus on the settlement of the frontier in the Great Plains, which was occupied by cattlemen after the subjugation of Native Americans. 44 We focus on the Great Plains because the land was relatively arid and as such its economic value at the time of settlement did not warrant 43 paying the Federal government's fixed price of $1.25/acre. Nevertheless, the region had economic value for ranching, which is a relatively capital intensive activity due to the need to acquire sufficient stock to be profitable. 45 For the first arrivals the land was abundant and ranchers were free to occupy where they pleased. This was 'possessor' specification and enforcement (Table 1 , cell 1). Cattlemen preceded other groups to the frontier of the Great Plains because they were the first actors to gain a net benefit from utilizing the land for grazing.
The Great Plains naturally consisted of a set of ranges. Over time it was difficult to establish exclusivity to an entire range because entrants had an incentive to come to the range as long as cattle prices increased and/or the railroad network expanded. The increasing number of entrants created an incentive for ranchers to try to limit entry and prevent externalities arising from over grazing of the common range. Further, current occupants would have an incentive to overstock the range as long as the private benefit was positive. These threats to range productivity created clear economic incentives for a move to group specification and enforcement that is, the rise of de facto commons arrangements.
Despite these incentives, it is not obvious that cattlemen's associations would emerge to solve these problems because of the familiar free rider problem. Three additional factors acted to increase the likelihood that commons arrangements would emerge. The number of ranchers on a single range was not large; initially, ranchers were quite homogeneous, sharing norms that facilitated cooperation; and ranchers had to perform a roundup. A "roundup" was a bi-annual activity of collecting the cattle that roamed over the range. Given the aridity of the region, cattle needed to roam relatively large distances to find adequate forage. In principle each rancher could perform his own roundup but this had several problems. Multiple individual roundups increased the potential for cattle stealing; the round-up was labor intensive and there were economies of scale in having one roundup rather than several; and it was stressful on the cattle whose grazing was disturbed when they were herded together. In short, a group roundup made obvious economic sense. As a result of the overwhelming economic incentives to prevent both outsider encroachment and insider overuse, de facto rights in the form of commons arrangements arose (cell 1).
The initial issue facing cattlemen's association was: who was in and who was out. To be a member of an association you had to have a range right. A rancher could gain a range right in several ways. The first rancher in the area acquired rights through "first possession", a well respected group belief about normative obligations underpinned by Lockean fairness. A rancher could file for a pre-emption claim that meant he had the right to purchase 160 acres at $1.25/acre when the government decided to put the land up for auction at some future date.
Land containing water was worth $1.25/acre and many ranchers opted for this avenue.
Alternatively, ranchers could homestead some land under the provisions of the Homestead Act (1862), the Timber Acts (1873 and 1878) and Desert Land Act (1879).
After formation, cattlemen's associations excluded parties that did not have a right to their particular range. They made the exclusion official by posting newspaper announcements that the range was closed. 46 The main threat came from attempted entry by other cattlemen with similar interests. While this increased the potential for conflict, actual conflict was low because the association could exclude non-members from the roundup. Given that the costs of an individual roundup were high, there was a disincentive for attempted entry by non-member cattlemen that limited conflict.
The de facto rights system worked reasonably well until the 1880s when a sharp rise in cattle prices attracted even more ranchers. The result of the bovine boom was a mixture of group property rights held by many of the original entrants and members of the cattlemen's associations and government property rights held by many of the larger scale corporations who entered during the run-up of prices in the early 1880s. To protect their "rights" both groups turned to fencing. "Cattlemen were accused of setting up small barbed-wire kingdoms to the 46 Dennen, "Cattlemen's Associations."
great detriment of the sturdy pioneer looking for land." 47 At this stage property rights on the Great Plains were a mixture of group and government specification and group enforcement.
The 1880s was a pivotal decade for the fate of de facto and de jure property rights on the Great Plains. Ranchers won the short run battle over the de facto use of land in the majority of the Great Plains despite some Congressional reports recommending either widespread sale or leasing of the land. 48 Many congressmen viewed the sale or lease of large plots of land with suspicion and allegations of supporting land monopolists. Indeed the notion of such large plots was quite foreign to the majority of Congressmen east of the 100 th meridian. 49 Not unexpectedly, ranchers did not endorse either the selling or the leasing of land because they preferred their de facto property rights. As a result, for much of the 1880s Congress maintained the status quo, which included de jure property rights for homesteaders but without enforcement; de jure fraudulently acquired property rights for some ranchers; and de facto rights for the majority of ranchers.
The majority of the ranges remained under de facto property rights where group enforcement prevailed. The situation increased the likelihood of conflict between ranchers and homesteaders once homesteaders began moving to the Great Plains in the 1870s. 50 In our framework we expect that government may specify but not enforce rights where it lacks the wealth to do so and/or when incumbents have significant political influence. In the U.S. case the power of large-scale ranching corporations in Congress, especially in the Senate, and through the executive branch strongly influenced the General Land Office (GLO). This allowed ranchers to keep the GLO budget constrained so it was unable to enforce homesteader rights (Table 1 , cell 2a). 51 One of the implications of the framework is that this reduces incentives for migrants to move to the frontier, reducing competition between heterogeneous parties and further limiting the potential for conflict. In the U.S., it is clear that with government specification but no government enforcement, actual conflict was reduced because until 1901 the government did not utilize the cavalry to counteract the overwhelming violence potential of incumbents against newcomers (cell 2a).
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Congress amended land laws again in 1891 with the General Revision Act. The Act was quite sweeping because it ended cash sales of land; repealed the pre-emption provisions;
repealed the Timber Culture Acts; and placed additional restrictions on claiming land through the Desert Act. These changes prevented ranchers from formalizing their de facto claims but did nothing to enforce the de jure claims of homesteaders. The GLO, continually budget constrained, did not engage in any anti-fencing activity until the Presidency of Teddy Roosevelt in 1901.
In 1901 Roosevelt sent out the cavalry to enforce the de jure rights of homesteaders.
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His decisive actions and a boom in wheat prices led to a rapid increase in the number of homesteads filed in the Great Plains states (Table1, cell 4). The increased settlement by homesteaders in the early 20 th century prompted the movement of ranching activities onto more 51 Robbins, Landed Heritage; Terrell, Land Grab. 52 In the U.S. there were some sporadic attempts at government enforcement but the efforts were quite As Brazil achieved its independence in 1822 its economy was undergoing an extended period of low economic activity due to the depressed prices of its main exports. Over the previous centuries the colony's economy had been through a sugar cycle (1550-1650) and a gold cycle (1700-1780) both predominantly based on slave labor. The lack of economic activity meant that there was little demand for land. Moreover, from 1822 to 1850, there was no land law in Brazil regarding the access and use of land. As commodity prices began to rise in the 1830s, however, the start of a century-long coffee boom led to increases in the demand for land, first in the region of Rio de Janeiro. The boom gradually expanded the frontier south towards São Paulo and eventually westward in the São Paulo interior.
Slave owners arrived on the frontier first. In 1800 there were approximately one million slaves in Brazil, mostly underutilized given the stagnant economy. There were very few small landowners because the Brazilian economy up to that point had offered practically no opportunities for smallholders who could not afford slaves. Few immigrants were willing to go to Brazil while slavery and large plantations dominated. In this period, possessor specification and enforcement determined frontier property rights (Table 1 , cell 1).
As the value of land rose after 1830, two related issues emerged for the coffee producers. In the absence of any de jure rule for allocating land, massive levels of squatting by large land claimants had been standard practice, covering huge expanses of land that were not effectively occupied or used. As coffee prices rose and raised the returns from land still beyond the frontier, conflicts erupted among competing claimants. Warren Dean states that during this period "...the landowners hired gunmen who killed not only recalcitrant backwoods 'intruders', but also other landowners." 54 Similarly Lígia Osório Silva notes that "… litigation and disputes over boundaries were the order of the day, being responsible for a great part of the fights among families and crimes in the interior." 55 The costs and rent dissipation generated by such conflicts gave rise to a demand for de jure rights.
Meanwhile, British pressure led to anticipation that the importation of slaves would cease in the near future and complete abolition would eventually follow. This led large coffee planters, who had been relying on slave labor, to seek to induce European immigration. From the coffee planters perspective, immigration incentives went hand in glove with establishing a 54 Dean, "Latifundia and Land Policy, " p. 611 55 Osório Silva, Terras Devolutas, p.133 land law that would assure that the immigrant labor would effectively be directed towards the plantations rather than moving to the frontier to squat on land of their own. Because these de jure rights were not fully enforced by the government, the situation of competing claims became increasingly combustible (Table 1, peasants, benefiting over 890 thousand families. The government reacted to invasions by organized landless peasants movements by reallocating rights to them. This strategy was successful because the salience of land reform for the median voter in Brazil forced the central government to systematically cave in to conflicts by expropriating the land in favor of the peasants.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The emergence and progression of property rights on a frontier is contextual and there will naturally be substantial variation in the histories of different countries. The approach presented in this paper does not seek to find a set pattern that should apply to every case of an emerging frontier. Instead, the method provides an integrated way to think about the differing roles of endowments, norms, and politics in influencing property rights at different junctures.
There is considerable agreement in the literature that factor endowments play a crucial role in determining which actors first move to a frontier and the activities in which they engage. But this outcome does not mean that the final allocations are inevitably predetermined and the approach here shows how norms and political forces can significantly alter the path of property rights.
The first potentially deviating force is the emergence of commons arrangements or clubs among a group of claimants that reduce the cost of exploiting the land and defending against outsiders. A second possible disruption takes place when government steps in to provide de jure property rights. A key aspect of the framework is the explicit recognition that the specification of the property right is often done by a different actor than the enforcement of the property right. This opens the possibility that at some point the possessors on the land may not have their de facto rights recognized. If this change in specification is followed by enforcement by a group or by the government, there may be some conflict and violence as the transition is made but that is likely to be temporary. However, it can also be the case that government opts not to enforce their specification, leading to a situation where competing claims will co-exist, 64 Alston, Libecap and Mueller, "Land Reform." one backed by de facto and the other by de jure rights. Yet even when this is the case, if one side has an overwhelming violence potential, actual conflict is unlikely. But, when each side perceives that it has a reasonable chance of asserting its right by force, conflict is the likely outcome.
Perhaps the most salient finding is that conflict is most likely in a frontier setting when the government specifies property rights to outsiders without enforcement. The political arena, especially one in which the franchise is broad, tends to induce governments to specify property rights to the "outsiders" rather than to the de facto initial claimant. In particular, in our three country studies we found that the occurrence of conflicts (or latent conflict) is often linked to the extent of the franchise giving voice to the preferences of the alternate land claimants or to populations far-removed, such as urban voters, which may have strong views on who they would like to see owning the land. Clearly the settlement process on the frontier in other countries may have followed very diverse paths, and we encourage analyses of the development of property rights on frontiers in other countries to better generalize results. At the very least the Australia, U.S. and Brazil cases show how political forces and social norms significantly impact the frontier path initially determined by factor endowments.
Terrell, John Upton. In (a) de facto and de jure specification and enforcement favor the claimant on the land. In (b) different claimants hold de facto and de jure rights. The probability of conflict is further affected by the relative violence capabilities of the claimants.
